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A COHERENT VIEW OF PATENT EXHAUSTION:




Notwithstanding the increased frequency of assertion of the
patent exhaustion defense in recent years, there is no clearly perceived
standard for its application. The Supreme Court's 1942 Univis Lens
decision, the controlling authority on patent exhaustion, mandated
that the authorized disposition of an article embodying the essential
features of a patent claim exhausts the patentee's exclusive right in
that claim. Sixty-two years later, Univis Lens is still misinterpreted.
However, a coherent reading of the essential features dictate of Univis
Lens and subsequent caselaw compels the conclusion that, in the
context of patent exhaustion, essential features are patentably
distinctive features. This conclusion provides an analytical
framework for determining whether the doctrine should apply in a
given factual situation and also resolves the apparent conflicts
between the patent exhaustion and related doctrines.
t Partner, Morgan & Finnegan, L.L.P., New York. The views expressed herein are
those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Morgan & Finnegan, L.L.P.
or its clients. Copyright © 2004, John W. Osborne, All Rights Reserved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent exhaustion doctrine, otherwise known as the first sale
doctrine, has undergone a resurgence over the past decade as an
affirmative defense in patent licensing and litigation. This resurgence
has been driven by the interdependent development of the computer
technology industry where, typically, numerous manufacturers are
involved in the ultimate production or assembly of computer-based
devices. This multiple-sourcing structure and the cross-licenses
common among the major computer component suppliers have led
system integrators to now routinely assert that combination, method
and system patents are exhausted by the licensed sale of components
used in a system, combination, or in practicing a method. However,
the decisions to date have not provided clear guidance as to the
circumstances under which patent exhaustion occurs. As a result,
patentees and would-be licensees/infringers must contend with
strained interpretations of seemingly conflicting caselaw.
The general statement of the patent exhaustion doctrine is
deceptively simple. It is clear under the exhaustion doctrine that a
patentee's exclusive right as manifested in a patent claim ends at the
first sale of patented goods.' However, application of this seemingly
straightforward doctrine has not been simple, straightforward or
consistent. Nonetheless, the available caselaw, although confusing
and seemingly conflicting, contains a consistent theme: the exclusive
right in a patent claim is exhausted when an article embodying the
"essential features" of the claim is transferred in an authorized and
unrestricted manner. Close analysis of the caselaw, including
controlling authority of the Supreme Court, shows that patentable
distinctiveness, vis-d-vis the article sold and the subject matter
claimed, is properly at issue in a patent exhaustion analysis.
Under applicable precedent, therefore, it is not possible to
determine whether an article embodies a claimed invention, i.e.,
contains the essential features, and thus whether the exhaustion
doctrine should apply, without first performing a claim construction
analysis as well as an examination of the prosecution history and the
pertinent prior art. At first glance, the requirement of an essential
features analysis may thus appear onerous. However, all patent
infringement cases hinge on a determination of what is actually
encompassed by a claim. There is no apparent reason why an
exhaustion analysis should be any less rigorous, particularly since
I. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc. 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).
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exhaustion applies to the authorized sale of an article embodying a
claimed invention. Unfortunately, some courts have invoked the
patent exhaustion doctrine to decide the extent of patent rights
without performing a thorough patent analysis. A clear enunciation
of the essential features standard by the Federal Circuit would
mandate that district courts perform a rigorous analysis of claim scope
as part of a patent exhaustion analysis and would thus eliminate much
of the inconsistency in application of the doctrine.
This article puts forth a coherent view of the law on patent
exhaustion, based on the essential features standard and grounded
firmly in Supreme Court precedent, with the objective of providing an
analytical procedure under which any set of facts can be analyzed to
make consistent predictions as to whether the doctrine of patent
exhaustion should apply.
II. SCOPE OF THE PATENT EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of patent exhaustion traces its roots to Supreme
Court precedent from the mid- 1 800s, and it was fully explicated ifi
1942 in the seminal Univis Lens 2 decision. The doctrine saw little
interest after Univis Lens until the 1990s, when it came to be viewed
as a viable affirmative defense in situations where there was an
authorized sale of a component of a patented combination.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
The doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that an authorized
sale of a patented article exhausts the patent monopoly as to that
article insofar as the article embodies the invention and thus precludes
any further royalty or restriction on the article.
[W]hen the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a
machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives
the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict
that use .... That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in
the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he
claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or
instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further
restriction .... 3
2. Id.
3. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453,456 (1873) (emphasis added).
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In general, for the doctrine to apply, the authorized sale of the
article must be made in the United States.4
The Supreme Court firmly established the patent exhaustion
doctrine in its Univis Lens decision:
The declared purpose of the patent law is to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts by granting to the inventor a limited
monopoly, the exercise of which will enable him to secure the
financial rewards for his invention. Constitution of the United
States, Art. I, § 8, CI. 8; 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 31, 40. The full extent of
the monopoly is the patentee's "exclusive right to make, use, and
vend the invention or discovery." The patentee may surrender his
monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale
of an article embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so
long as he retains the ownership of the patented article. But sale of
it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not
thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of
the article.
5
The United States government had brought suit against the
Univis Company under the Sherman Act asserting that Univis' patent
licensing and sales scheme was in violation of the provisions of the
Sherman Act, which make unlawful any contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states.6
Although ostensibly an antitrust case, the resolution of Univis Lens
was based on principles of patent exhaustion.
The disputed activity in Univis Lens involved the manufacture
and sale of lens blanks, embodying the essential features of patents
directed to a finished lens and related manufacturing methods. As a
factual matter, such blanks were without utility until ground and
polished into the finished lens claimed in the patents.7 Univis, the
patent holder, had three classes of licensees-wholesalers, finishing
4. Boesch v. Graft, 133 U.S. 697, 701-03 (1890); accord Jazz Photo v. ITC, 264 F.3d
1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of
foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of the first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale
must have occurred under the United States patent."); Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd., v. Jazz Photo
Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450 (D.N.J. 2003) (sale must be "in the United States" to invoke
patent exhaustion doctrine); but see Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac Tech. Dev. Corp.,
690 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (license grant may have extraterritorial effect and
result in exhaustion where license to sell abroad extends to products coming "within the scope"
of U.S. patents).
5. Univis Lens, 316 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
6. Univis Lens, 316 U.S. at 242-43.
7. Id. at 249.
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retailers, and prescription retailers. 8 The issue for the Court was
whether the Univis Company could impose conditions, i.e., fix resale
prices, on the downstream licensees after articles embodying the
essential features of the patent claims had been sold by other
licensees.
The Supreme Court resolved the matter by applying the
exhaustion doctrine to the sale from licensees of the partially
completed article (lens blank) encompassing the essential features of
the eight patents-in-suit. 9 Thus, although attempts have been made,
and are still made today, to characterize Univis Lens as an antitrust or
implied license decision, the fundamental holding was based entirely
on the patent exhaustion doctrine.
The Court clearly established in Univis Lens that the doctrine of
patent exhaustion extends to the sale of a partially complete patented
article, provided that the article encompasses the essential features of
the claimed invention:
where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished
by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his
invention so far as it is or may be embodied in a particular
article. 1
0
The Court determined that the articles at issue included the
essential features of the patents, and thus, were not capable of any
noninfringing use:
each blank, as appellees insist, embodies essential features of the
patented device and is without utility until it is ground and
polished as the finished lens of the patent .... [U]pon familiar
principles the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use
only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent
monopoly with respect to the article sold.
The Court also noted in Univis Lens that the sale of lens blanks
by an unlicensed manufacturer to an unlicensed finisher for
completion into a finished product would constitute contributory
infringement. 12 Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that, "where
the sale of the blank is by the patentee or his licensee ... to a finisher,
8. Id. 244.
9. Id. 249.
10. Id. 250-51 (emphasis added).
11. Id. 249.
12. 316 U.S. at 249.
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the only use to which it could be put and the only object of the sale is
to enable the latter to grind and polish it for use as a lens by the
prospective wearer."' 3  Thus, the Supreme Court found that the
unfinished lens included the essential features of the claimed
invention.14  Accordingly, the Univis Company was held to have
exhausted its patent rights with regard to the finishers, and therefore
was precluded from controlling subsequent sales. The Court stated
"the patentee cannot control the resale price of patented articles which
he has sold, either by resort to an infringement suit, or.. .by
stipulating for price maintenance by his vendees."' 15 Hence, the
Supreme Court concluded that the degree of "completion" of the
article was irrelevant:
Whether the licensee sells the patented article in its completed
form or sells it before completion for the purpose of enabling the
buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted with the article,
and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ... that article.
To that extent, he has parted with his patent monopoly in either
case, and has received in the purchase price every benefit of that
monopoly which the patent law secures to him
6
The analysis put forth by the Supreme Court in Univis Lens
related to the scope of the patent monopoly in contrast to contractual
analysis which underlies the related, but different, doctrine of implied
license. An understanding of the different doctrinal bases of the
exhaustion and implied license doctrines, as discussed below,' 7 is
necessary to form a clear understanding of the Supreme Court
directive in Univis Lens. Further, such an understanding of Univis
Lens clarifies the misapprehension which has caused confusion
between the two doctrines.
As the Supreme Court's most recent and thorough treatment of
the issue, Univis Lens is the controlling authority on patent
exhaustion. The Univis Lens case arose in the context of price fixing,
13. Id. at 249.
14. Id. at 251. Specifically, the Court explained:
[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies
essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent,
and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the
patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in a particular
article.
Id.
15. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at252.
17. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20
2004] A COHERENT VIEW OF PATENT EXHAUSTION 651
but its holding is clearly not limited to those circumstances. Neither
the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has ever expressly
disavowed or sought to limit the exhaustion holding of Univis Lens.'
8
To the contrary, a long line of cases cites to Univis Lens for its
holding and statements regarding patent exhaustion., 
9
B. Decisions Following the Essential Features Dictate of Univis
Lens
Two district courts have explicitly followed Univis Lens to find
exhaustion of combination claims under an essential features analysis.
1. Cyrix v. Intel
In Cyrix v. Intel, a case involving a "foundry" type
manufacturing arrangement, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas, on facts similar to those of Univis Lens, came to a
conclusion of patent exhaustion by applying the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Univis Lens.20  Cyrix v. Intel echoed Univis
Lens when it held that "[t]he patent exhaustion doctrine is so strong
that it applies even to an incomplete product that has no substantial
use other than to be further manufactured into a completed patented
and allegedly infringing article. 21
In Cyrix v. Intel, the disputed activity involved the manufacture
and sale of microprocessors. The district court noted that "Cyrix's
microprocessors cannot be used for any commercially viable purpose
without necessarily forming the combination covered by-and
18. As explained in a recent opinion from the Northern District of California in response
to an argument that Univis Lens was an implied license decision:
In Met-Coil, the Federal Circuit did not distinguish Univis Lens, nor did it
criticize the district court's reliance on Univis Lens, nor did it indicate that Univis
Lens had been refined or modified by subsequent cases. Therefore, there is no
binding authority requiring this Court to treat Univis Lens as an implied license
case. As noted above, the case does not lend itself to such a reading. Rather,
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Univis Lens, the patent
exhaustion doctrine applies to the sale of unpatented items that have no other
function but as components in a finished, patented device.
LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 1598 (N.D. Cal. 2002), reaff'd,
summ.judg granted, in part, 248 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
19. See, e.g., id.; Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp. 846 F. Supp. 522, 540 (E.D. Tex 1994), aff'd
without op., 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1200, 1214
(E.D. Tex. 1992), appeal dismissed without op., 9 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v.
Kuther, 377 U.S. 422, 425 (1964).
20. Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp. 846 F. Supp. 522, 540 (E.D. Tex 1994), aff'd without op.,
42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
21. Id.
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without necessarily infringing-claims 2 and 6 of the '338 Patent.,
22
The court held that the microprocessors had to be combined with
external memory to be useful. Intel, the patent owner, had entered
into a broad cross-license agreement with Texas Instruments that
involved patents covering the subject microprocessors. Texas
Instruments made microprocessors at the request of Cyrix and
subsequently sold them to Cyrix. When combined with external
memory, the microprocessors sold to Cyrix would infringe Intel's
patent. Cyrix sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement
against Intel based on license defenses and patent exhaustion. Intel
sought judgment against Cyrix for infringement in a separate suit, and
the cases were consolidated. Texas Instruments intervened on behalf
of Cyrix based on license defenses and patent exhaustion.
In making its determination, the district court likened the
circumstances to those in Univis Lens:
Cyrix's microprocessors .... need to be combined with external
memory to be used. Cyrix's microprocessors thus are like the lens
blanks in [Univis] which, although completed lens blanks, had no
use other than to be ground into finished lenses in accordance with
patents owned by the Lens Company. The Supreme Court's
rationale in Univis, in support of its holding that patent owners
rights in the lens blanks were exhausted, is thus fully applicable
here with respect to Cyrix's microprocessors.
23
Thus the district court held that "[b]ecause all claim 1
microprocessors must be combined with external memory to be
useful, a claim (such as claim 2) describing a device consisting of a
claim I microprocessor and external memory would be exhausted by
the sale of the claim 1 microprocessor .... [so] the patentee cannot
escape exhaustion .. ,24 The court concluded that:
Intel is barred ...from asserting [the claims] against Cyrix or
Cyrix's customers. . . .Since Cyrix's claim 1 microprocessors
cannot be used without infringing claims 2 and 6 of the '338
Patent, there are no commercially viable noninfringing uses for the
microprocessors. Intel's rights in claim 1, 2 and 6 have been
exhausted.
25
22. Id. at 541.
23. Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 538.
25. Id. at 541.
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The district court in Cyrix v. Intel found the component and
combination claims to be coextensive because they all included the
essential features of the invention as claimed elements:
The Intel 80286 microprocessor had on-chip segmentation
circuitry and required external memory to be operable. The
advance of the '338 Patent over the memory management system
used on the 80286 microprocessor was the addition of on-chip
paging circuitry .... and the ability to choose between the prior art
segmentation alone and the combination of segmentation plus
paging are essential features of claims 1 [component], 2
[combination], and 6 [combination] of the '338 Patent.
2
After performing a claim construction analysis as well as a
review of the prosecution history to determine the scope of the
invention recited by the claims, the court found that the claimed
microprocessor component embodied essential features of a memory
management system, which included on-chip paging circuitry and the
capability to switch between segmentation alone or segmentation in
combination with paging.27' 28 The court determined that nothing in
the memory itself added anything of patentable significance to the
invention embodied in the microprocessor.29 Relying on Univis Lens,
the court characterized the aspects stated as distinguishing over prior
art as essential features. 30  This view of Univis Lens was the most
26. 846 F. Supp. at 534 (emphasis added).
27. Intel argued unsuccessfully that the combination claims were directed to patentably
distinct features in the external memory. The court disposed of Intel's contention by concluding
that "Intel's interpretation of claims 2 and 6, however, is not credible. It is inconsistent with the
manner in which Intel is interpreting claim 1 now, and the way in which Intel has interpreted
claims 2 and 6 in the past." The court's conclusion was based on positions Intel had taken
during prosecution and in licensing negotiations. 846 F. Supp. at 531.
28. The district court further stated regarding Intel's contention:
Intel's assertion that claims 2 and 6 require the step of actually storing page table
entries and segment descriptors in external memory and until that process is
performed, the limitations of claims 2 and 6 are not met, is wrong as a matter of
law. Intel is trying to read into device claims 2 and 6 a method of operating the
device. This is improper because it is mixing two different classes of
invention-a product and a process-in the same claim.... Even if Intel's
interpretation of claims 2 and 6 were the correct one, the invention of claim I that
Intel asserts is embodied within Cyrix's microprocessors still would have no use
unless the microprocessors were combined with external memory holding page
table entries and segment descriptors.
846 F. Supp. at 537 (alteration in original).
29, Id. at 538 ("Where, as here, the rights in a claim for a combination are exhausted by
the sale of a component of the combination [claim 1 microprocessor], the patentee cannot escape
exhaustion by specifying that the combined component [external memory] be performing a
specific function when that function is an inherent capability of that component.").
30. Id. at 534.
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illuminating interpretation of the Supreme Court decision since it was
issued in 1942. Under this interpretation of Univis Lens, essential
features are patentably distinct features. The focus on patentable
distinctiveness offered a decisive resolution to the quandary over how
and where to draw the line in an exhaustion analysis. The district




Two recent decisions in an action in the Northern District of
California involving LG Electronics as plaintiff against numerous
defendants ("LGE decisions") followed Univis Lens and Cyrix v. Intel
to conclude that apparatus claims were exhausted due to the licensed
sale of components embodying the essential features of the apparatus
claims.32' 33 The circumstances present in the LGE decisions were
similar to those found both in Univis Lens and Cyrix v. Intel. The lens
blanks in Univis Lens had no noninfringing use other than to be
finished and then sold; in Cyrix v. Intel, the microprocessors had no
"commercially viable" noninfringing use other than to be coupled to
external memory. In LGE, microprocessors and chipsets were made
by Intel under license and purchased by Asustek and other system
manufacturers. The only use for the licensed microprocessors and
chipsets was in a computer system covered by the asserted patent
claims. Both Univis Lens and Cyrix v. Intel involved a patentee
licensing to third parties to make and sell a product which included
essential features of a patent claim. The LGE court interpreted Univis
Lens and Cyrix v. Intel to preclude a patentee from collecting an
additional royalty from any buyer of the partially completed product
for the right to assemble a combination which required essential
features purchased in the component:
[T]he holding and reasoning of Cyrix is persuasive authority for
the proposition that the sale or license of an essential element of a
patented device may exhaust the patentee's statutory right to
exclude others from making, selling or using that device.
34
31. Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
32. As discussed below, the second LGE decision held method claims not exhausted. See
infra note 130 and accompanying text.
33. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 1598 (N.D. Cal.
2002); LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp 2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(collectively referred to herein as "LGE" decisions) (the second LGE decision reaffirmed the
first decisions' holding of exhaustion of apparatus claims).
34. LG Elecs., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1595.
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LGE argues that the patent exhaustion doctrine applies only to the
sale of a patented device and, because the Intel microprocessor
does not, on its own, embody any of the claims of the five patents
at issue here, LGE's rights under those patents are not exhausted.
LGE contends that Univis Lens does not stand for a contrary
position because Univis Lens did not deal with the patent
exhaustion doctrine at all. Rather, Univis Lens applied the related
but distinct doctrine of implied license . . . [H]owever, the Univis
Court relied heavily on precedent articulating the patent exhaustion
doctrine.
35
Consistent with Univis Lens and Cyrix, the district court
determined that the components made by Intel under license from
LGE had no use other than to be used in an allegedly infringing
manner. LGE contended that using the Intel microprocessors and
chipsets as replacement parts was a substantial noninfringing use of
the product. However, the district court concluded that such use was
not reasonable as required by caselaw.36  A finding that the
microprocessors and chipsets had noninfringing uses would have
bolstered a defense against patent exhaustion because the Supreme
Court held in Univis Lens that an article including essential features
of a patent claim has no noninfringing uses.3 7  But, as discussed
below, 38 pursuant to the interpretation of Univis Lens presented here,
a finding that an article has no noninfringing uses does not necessarily
result in a conclusion of exhaustion if the article sold does not contain
the essential features of the invention, i.e., if the article sold is
patentably distinct from the patent claim.
3. The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Applies To
Components Which Embody The Essential Features Of
A Patented Combination
In LGE, LGE's argument that a patent is exhausted only when a
licensee sells a product which embodies all of the elements of at least
one claim in a patent was properly rejected. LGE argued that an
35. Id. at 1596.
36. Id. at 1600 ("The limited utility of the microprocessors and chipsets as replacement
parts is not, alone, a sufficient non-infringing use. Defendants are manufacturers of computers.
It would not be wise from a business standpoint for them to purchase computer components
solely for resale..."); see also Glass Equipment Dev. Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1342-
43 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
37. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241,251 (1942).
38. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
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"incomplete" or "partially complete" product cannot give rise to the
patent exhaustion doctrine:
LGE contends that pursuant to . . . footnote [1] in Glass
Equipment, the patent exhaustion doctrine does not apply to
"unpatented elements" of a patent in suit. The Intel
microprocessors and chipsets, moreover, merely embody some
elements of the broader patents in suit. Consequently, the patent
exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable here.
However, the key fact in both Bandag and Glass Equipment was
not whether the device utilized by the defendant was patented or
not. More important was the fact that the plaintiffs in both cases
alleged infringement of a method patent, and not infringement of
an apparatus patent.
39
LGE's argument was doomed to fail. The Supreme Court in Univis
Lens had firmly established that an incomplete or partially completed
article which embodied the essential features of the patent gave rise to
the exhaustion doctrine. 40 For example, the district court in Cyrix v.
Intel, citing Univis Lens, explained that "the patent exhaustion
doctrine is so strong that it applies even to an incomplete product that
has no substantial use other than to be manufactured into a completed
patent and allegedly infringing article. '
The Federal Circuit has also acknowledged that an incomplete or
partially completed article can give rise to the exhaustion doctrine.42
In Anton/Bauer, the Federal Circuit quoted the language from Univis
Lens regarding essential features 43 to support its conclusion that
exhaustion had occurred due to the sale of a component of a claimed
combination.44 The Federal Circuit thus could have taken the
opportunity in Anton/Bauer to expressly acknowledge that the
39. LG Elecs., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1597.
40. See316U.S. at251.
41. 846 F. Supp. at 540.
42. Anton/Bauer, Inc, v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Specifically,
the Federal Circuit explained:
[t]he sale of the unpatented female plate by Anton/Bauer is a complete transfer of
the ownership of the plate. In effect, the sale extinguishes Anton/Bauer's right to
control the use of the plate, because the plate can only be used in the patented
combination and the combination must be completed by the purchaser.
Id
43. 329 F.3d at 1351 ... uncompleted article which, because it embodies essential
features of his patented invention...").
44. Id. ("Anton/Bauer places on the market one component of a patented combination
that has no other use than to complete the patent combination with a second unpatented
component.").
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patentable distinctiveness of the combination claim was embodied in
the component sold. This would have immensely aided subsequent
exhaustion analyses in patent infringement cases. However, the
Federal Circuit did not make such an express acknowledgement in
Anton/Bauer, but instead added to the confusion between the
doctrines of patent exhaustion and implied license.
In Univis Lens itself, the initial lens blanks (the sale of which
exhausted the patent rights) did not embody all of the elements of at
least one claim of the patents at issue. But, the Supreme Court found
the patent exhaustion doctrine applicable anyway. If the Supreme
Court had not applied the patent exhaustion doctrine to the lens
blanks on the basis that the lens blanks did not embody each element
of at least one claim in the patents at issue, the Univis Company could
have collected multiple royalties from each licensee in the lens
finishing chain. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that:
[w]hether the licensee sells the patented article in its completed
form or sells it before completion for the purpose of enabling the
buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted with the article,
and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of
the invention with respect to that article. To that extent, he has
parted with his patent monopoly in either case, and has received in
the purchase price every benefit of that monopoly which the patent
law secures in him.45
Even with the abundance of precedent establishing that the
authorized sale of a component can exhaust a system or combination
claim, litigants and commentators continue to argue to the contrary.46
Such arguments are inappropriate in light of the "essential features"
analysis dictated by Univis Lens and its progeny. There is simply no
credible basis for the proposition that a patent claim must be
completely embodied in the article sold for exhaustion to occur.
45. Univis Lens, 316 U.S. at 252.
46. See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 1596, 1598
n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2002):
LGE argues that the patent exhaustion doctrine applies only to the sale of a
patented device and, because the Intel microprocessor does not, on its own,
embody any of the claims of the five patents at issue here, LGE's rights under
those patents are not exhausted.... [P]atent exhaustion doctrine also applies to
the sale of non-patented devices which have no use other than as components in a
device that practices the patent.
Id.; see also, Amber L. Hatfield, Patent Exhaustion, Implied License, and Have-Made Rights:
Gold Mines or Mine Fields?, 2000 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 1, 6. ("The patent exhaustion
doctrine also does not apply if the patentee or licensee sells only a component of a patented
system, because, again, the patent claim at issue does not cover the products as sold.").
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Univis Lens requires only that the article contain all of the essential
features of the claim.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE PATENT EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
In addition to the requirements that a sale be authorized and the
article sold embody the invention, the sale must also be
"unconditional" to invoke the patent exhaustion doctrine. The degree
to which conditions may be placed on the sale of patented articles has
been hotly debated and litigated in recent years. As discussed below,
the conclusion to be drawn from the Federal Circuit's
pronouncements on the subject is that a patentee may withhold rights
granted under the patent laws, but may not impose any limitations on
the sale of an article which are outside the bounds of the rights
granted under the patent laws.
A. The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Does Not Negate a Lawful
Express Restriction
The key determinant as to whether a patent is exhausted is
whether the patent owner has sold the patented good outright or
whether lawful restrictions have been placed on the sale.4 7 However,
to effectively preclude operation of the exhaustion doctrine,
conditions involving the sale of an article embodying a patented
invention must be clear, explicit, and otherwise lawful.
The rationale for the patent exhaustion doctrine is that
purchasers of patented goods who lack knowledge of any restrictions
should be free to use the goods in an unlimited manner:
[T]he policy which best seems to justify the exhaustion principle is
that since the exclusive patent right is a limited exception ... the
exercise of this right should be cut off after the first sale of the
patented goods because the sale provides adequate financial reward
to stimulate invention and, without the termination of the right, the
patentee could independently control the goods indefinitely,
thereby giving him absolute control over the product market and
leaving subsequent purchasers, who might be subject to a patent
infringement action, in a position of great uncertainty.
47. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (exhaustion occurs where the sale of the
patented article "is absolute and without any conditions"); accord Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249
F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (N.D. Miss. 2001) ("The exhaustion doctrine only applies where the sale
or license of the patented invention is an unconditional one."); Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott
Labs, Inc., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[A]n unconditional sale of a patented device
exhausts the patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of the device thereafter.").
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... The principle originated from the need to define the interest
that a purchaser receives when purchasing patented goods, it being
found that there are no accompanying implied restrictions... 48
However, a patent owner has broad discretion within the
confines of the antitrust laws and the patent misuse doctrine to
expressly restrict a patent license agreement. For example, the trial
court in General Talking Pictures, an often-cited case dealing with
license restrictions, held that royalties due for practice of combination
patents were unaffected by any notion of patent exhaustion where
components were sold under a restricted license which was known by
the purchaser to preclude unauthorized practice of combination
patents:
[T]he mere fact of sale by the licensee, American Transformer
Company, to the defendant did not deprive the plaintiffs of their
rights to exclude the defendant from the fields of operation and
distribution of the patented device which the plaintiffs have
reserved, according to the terms of the license granted to the
American Transformer Company, to the defendant's actual
knowledge.
49
In response to an "exhaustion" argument, the trial court in
General Talking Pictures held that the authorized sale of separately
patented tubes did not permit the purchaser, who was aware of a use
restriction, to use the tubes in a manner inconsistent with the relevant
license.50, 51 General Talking Pictures, which was affirmed by the
48. W. Birdwell, Exhaustion of Rights And Patent Licensing Market Restrictions, 60 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 203, 216, 229 (1978).
49. Western Elec. Co. v. General Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
1936) (emphasis added), affd, 91 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1937), affd, 304 U.S. 175 (1938), affd on
rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
50. 16 F. Supp. at 300.
51. General Talking Pictures is still good law as it was cited with approval in Aro Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 483 (1964) ("it has often and
clearly been held that unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement"). More
recently, the Federal Circuit has also relied on General Talking Pictures as authority for a
patentee's right to impose a license restriction respecting the terms of sale of a patented article:
[T]he district court held that no restriction whatsoever could be imposed under
the patent law, whether or not the restriction was enforceable under some other
law, and whether or not this was a first sale to a purchaser with notice. This
ruling is incorrect, for if Mallinckrodt's restriction was a valid condition of the
sale, then in accordance with General Talking Pictures it was not excluded from
enforcement under the patent law.
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also
Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus. Inc., 535 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1976) (patentee successfully relied on
General Talking Pictures to obtain reversal of grant of preliminary injunction to purchaser claiming
right to use putatively licensed material).
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Supreme Court, makes clear that the doctrine of patent exhaustion
applies only to implied restrictions on purchased goods.52'53
It is beyond question that an agreement respecting patent rights
is a contract and must therefore be construed so as to give effect to the
intent of the parties.54 Thus, as the Federal Circuit made clear in its
Mallinckrodt decision, an express restriction precludes exhaustion of
the withheld right, assuming there is no antitrust violation or patent
misuse, if the parties so intended:
Unless the condition violates some other law or policy (in the
patent field, notably the misuse or antitrust law, e.g., United States
v. Univis Lens Co., private parties retain the freedom to contract
concerning conditions of sale. As we have discussed, the district
court cited the price-fixing and tying cases as reflecting what the
court deemed to be the correct policy, viz., that no condition can be
placed on the sale of patented goods, for any reason. However,
this is not a price-fixing or tying case, and the per se antitrust and
misuse violations found in the Bauer trilogy and Motion Pictures
Patents are not here present. The appropriate criterion is whether
Mallinckrodt's restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or
whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent grant and into
behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the
rule of reason.
5W
Thus, a lawful express restriction cannot be negated by the doctrine of
patent exhaustion. This is true because an unconditional sale,
required for patent exhaustion, cannot exist where there is a lawful
express restriction. The Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed this
doctrine in the Braun Medical case:
[A]n unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the
patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of the device
52. See Western Elec., 16 F. Supp. at 300; accord Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456-57
(1873) (purchasers of goods from manufacturing licensee were not subject to any implied
restrictions on use of goods even though licensee itself was subject to express territorial
restrictions); see also Birdwell, supra at 48 ("A close examination of the fundamental Adams
decision reveals that it was directed only to implied restrictions on purchased goods.");
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701 (actual notice of a "single use only" restriction was not disputed).
53. Express restrictions in patent licenses are analogous to restrictive covenants in real
property law-which are enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of restricted property if the
purchaser had constructive notice of the restriction. E.g., Gordon v. Village of Lawrence, 443
N.Y.S.2d 415 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1981), af'd, 453 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Court of Appeals, 1982).
54. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 874
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
55. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708 (citation omitted); see also Birdwell, supra note 48, at
214 ("[E]xpress restrictions on purchased goods are enforceable under patent law, except for
certain restrictions found to be in restraint of trade.").
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thereafter. The theory behind this rule is that in such a transaction,
the patentee has bargained for, and received, an amount equal to
the full value of the goods. This exhaustion doctrine, however,
does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such
a transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties
negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the "use" rights
conferred by the patentee. As a result, express conditions
accompanying the sale or license of a patented product are
generally upheld. Such express conditions, however, are
contractual in nature and are subject to antitrust, patent, contract,
and any other applicable law, as well as equitable considerations
such as patent misuse. Accordingly, conditions that violate some
law or equitable consideration are unenforceable. On the other
hand, violation of valid conditions entitles the patentee to a remedy
for either patent infringement or breach of contract.56
The Federal Circuit also held in Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-
Type that, to be enforceable against the purchaser, a restriction or
condition must be explicit. The court stated "[a] non-contractual
intention is simply the seller's hope or wish, rather than an
enforceable restriction. 5 7  In Hewlett-Packard, the patentee argued
that its instruction manual's admonishment to "discard old print
cartridges immediately" created an enforceable condition on the sale
which prevented the cartridges from being reused. The Federal
Circuit held that this language did not create a conditional sale, and
that the cartridges were sold unconditionally.
58
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit made clear in Braun
Medical that restrictions must be express to be enforceable. Some
courts, for example the Northern District of Iowa in the Pioneer Hi-
Bred case, have found restrictions enforceable even though they did
not view the restrictions as express:
[W]here, as here, the "limited label license" expressly grants only
some of the rights identified in [35 U.S.C.] § 154, it follows that
56. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted), where the district court relied on, inter alia, Braun Medical, to conclude:
In short, the circumstances of the sale indicate: (1) purchasers, including end-
users, are on notice of the single-use condition; (2) purchasers have an
opportunity to reject the condition; and (3) the Prebate is offered at a special
price that reflects an exchange for a single-use condition. Based on these
circumstances, the Court concludes that Lexmark has not exhausted its rights.
The Prebate is a conditional sale and the single-use condition is enforceable.
57. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453
(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1022 (1998).
58. Id. at 1455.
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the only reasonably possible meaning of the language is that all
other rights are reserved .... Ottawa's contention that patent rights
must be expressly reserved or they are waived stands on its head
the principle that the patentee's right under the patent is the right to
exclude.
5
The district court in Pioneer Hi-Bred unnecessarily grappled
with the express versus implied issue. All that Mallinckrodt and
Braun Medical required is that use restrictions be express, not that a
reservation of rights be express. On the facts of Pioneer Hi-Bred, the
use restrictions were express, even though the reservation of rights
was not.6°
B. Sales Can be Restricted but Exhaustion Cannot be
Disclaimed
Pursuant to Mallinckrodt, an express restriction is enforceable
under the patent law absent evidence of an antitrust violation or patent
misuse, i.e., if such restriction is reasonably within the patent grant.
Thus, a contractual exclusion of rights to combination or apparatus
claims, which are not embodied in the article sold, would not appear
to be a violation of antitrust law. The same is true for patent claims
which are separate and distinct from claims covering the article sold.
Regarding misuse, it is clear that an exclusion of rights to
combination claims is not a prohibited extension of the patent
monopoly to unpatented items-such restrictions are recognized as
enforceable, and thus cannot be misuse.61 Moreover, it is not misuse
to exercise control over the sale of a nonstaple article useful only in
making a patented combination.62' 63 It is therefore reasonably within
the rights conferred by the patent grant to collect royalties for the sale
of a contributorily infringing component so long as the total royalty
recovered is based on an amount that does not exceed the full value of
59. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1038-39
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (alteration in original).
60. Id. at 1039 (restriction expressly limited use of seed to production of forage or grain
for feeding or processing).
61. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Continental Lamp Works, Inc., 280 F. 846, 851-52
(2d Cir. 1922); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612, 613-14 (2d Cir. 1937); see also
cases cited infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2).
63. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Corp., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944), held that it
was misuse for the patent owner to license others to sell the nonstaple element of a combination for
use in the patented invention. This holding was legislatively overruled by 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(2)
which states that granting a release from contributory infringement of a combination patent is not
misuse.
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the patented combination. 64 Excluding rights to a combination claim
where the component and combination are patentably separate and
distinct is also not misuse.65
Thus, computer system manufacturers do not obtain a right in
combination claims merely by purchase of a "licensed" component.
There is no grant of any right in a combination claim under such
circumstances if the purchaser was aware of restrictions on the
purchased item which required additional royalties to be paid for
practice of the combination claim, i.e., where a full royalty for
practice of the combination claim has not been received. Such
restrictions will, pursuant to the General Talking Pictures line of
cases, defeat any argument that authorized sales of components can
exhaust combination claims for which royalties have never accrued.
Notably, Mallinckrodt involved the legality of a single use
restriction. Whether the sale of a component exhausted a
combination or method claim was not at issue. There was no attempt
to prevent the purchaser from using the article for its intended
purpose; nor was there any attempt in Mallinckrodt to unlawfully
extend the patent monopoly. The Mallinckrodt case and its ilk can be
harmonized with the Univis Lens line of cases once it is understood
that the royalty received by the patentee in Mallinckrodt was
bargained for based on a single use of the patented article. If the
article in Mallinckrodt had been an incomplete component embodying
essential features of a claimed combination or method without any
other reasonable use, the exhaustion doctrine would have applied
under Univis Lens.66
In Mallinckrodt, the asserted claim covered the device sold.6 7
There was no misuse because there was no to attempt to broaden the
64. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377 U.S. 476, 501-
02 (1964).
65. See Lifescan, Inc. v. Polymer Tech. Int'l Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1238 (W.D.
Wash. 1995) ("The court notes that in [Rohm & Haas v.] Dawson the patentee was permitted to
limit competition in the sale of an unpatented staple item, whereas here the strip itself is
patented, thus making this an even stronger case in favor of a finding of no misuse.") (emphasis
in original); see also Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (misuse occurs where a restrictive license broadens the scope of the patent beyond what is
covered by the claims and is anti-competitive), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
66. But see James B. Kobak, Jr., Contracting Around Exhaustion: Some Thoughts About
the CAFC's Mallinckrodt Decision, 75 J. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc'y 550, 554 (1993)
(criticizing Mallinckrodt decision as turning implied license, exhaustion and antitrust into a
"confusing melange").
67. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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scope of the claim beyond the claim's actual coverage. 68 The only
issue was whether a use restriction was allowable. 69 The use right is
one of the rights granted to a patentee, thus it was not misuse to
impose a restriction on the use of the article sold.70 The restriction on
use in Mallinckrodt was not an attempt to expand the scope of a
patent claim to cover something not patented, which clearly is not
within the rights conferred in the patent grant. Nor would an
exclusion of the right to practice a combination claim directed to
patentably distinct subject matter be misuse because the patentee is
entitled to a separate royalty for the combination claim. However, an
exclusion of the right to complete a combination not involving
patentably distinct subject matter would constitute impermissible
broadening of patent scope, and thus, misuse.
Notwithstanding the above analysis, pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision in Masonite, a patentee would be ill-advised to assert
that exhaustion of a combination claim has been effectively
disclaimed where a full royalty for the combination has been
recovered via the sale of a component of the combination.
[W]hen the patented product "passes to the hands of the purchaser,
it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside
of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress."
In applying that rule this Court has quite consistently refused to
allow the form into which the parties chose to cast the transaction
to govern. The test has been whether or not there has been such a
disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee
has received his reward for the use of the article.7 1
However, the rule of Masonite should not affect a patentee's
ability to exclude rights in patent claims for which a fair royalty has
not been recovered. More precisely, even though "true" exhaustion
cannot be disclaimed, i.e., where an authorized sale of an article
embodying the claimed invention has occurred, an exclusion of rights
to combination claims is effective if there is no unlawful extension of
the patent monopoly. 72  Thus, the authorized sale of a component
68. Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001-02; see id. (discussing the concept of patent misuse).
69. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701-03.
70. Id. at 701, 709; Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
71. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1942) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
72. J. Cohen & M. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33 (2001) ("Because the exhaustion doctrine is based in patent policy,
however, and not the patentee's intent, it is harder to avoid by contract."); see also Hewlett-
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would not exhaust a combination claim unless a full royalty for the
combination was recovered via the sale of the component. Consistent
with Univis Lens and its progeny, where the component embodies the
invention of the combination, exhaustion should be conclusively
established, notwithstanding any attempted disclaimer.
It was clear from the licensing arrangement in Univis Lens that
the patentee received all the royalty it sought or expected via the sale
of the component. The Supreme Court observed that "lt]he rewards
of the corporate appellees for the exploitation of the patents and the
patented lenses are derived wholly from the sales by the Lens
Company of the blanks .... However, the Court explicitly refused
to hold that further royalties could not have been recovered.
In the present case the entire consideration and compensation for
both [lens blank and finishing process] is the purchase price paid
by the finishing licensee to the Lens Company. We have no
question here of what other stipulations, for royalties or otherwise,
might have been exacted as a part of the entire transaction, which
do not seek to control the disposition of the patented article after
the sale.
74
Thus, the patentee in Univis Lens seemingly could have included
in its license agreements provision for payment of additional royalties
for both the lens blank and practice of the finishing process without
running afoul of the Supreme Court's prohibition of post-sale control,
so long as a double royalty was not collected. Interpreted broadly,
this statement appears to create tension with the main theme of Univis
Lens, i.e., that a sale of a component embodying the essential features
of a patent exhausts that patent. However, the statement is better
interpreted as meaning only that a higher royalty could have been
charged or that restrictions reasonably within the patent grant could
have been imposed.
Subsequent decisions interpreting Univis Lens have recognized
that sale of a component embodying the essential features of an
invention exhausts all claims to that invention notwithstanding any
Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The
question is not whether the patentee at the time of sale intended to limit a purchaser's right to
modify the product.... Each case turns on its facts, but a seller's intent, unless embodied in an
enforceable contract, does not create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell or
modify a patented product."), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1022 (1998).
73. 316 U.S. at 245.
74. Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
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attempted disclaimer. For instance, in Cyrix v. Intel,75 attempted
disclaimers were ineffective to negate exhaustion. As discussed
above, the component and combination claims were found to be
coextensive, and thus the patentee, which stipulated to exhaustion of
the component claim, was deemed to have received its full reward for
the patent by virtue of the authorized sale of the component.
Moreover, as pointed out in LGE, merely because conditions
may be placed on the sale of an article embodying an invention does
not mean that a patentee can do so unilaterally:
[T]he mere fact that LGE is entitled to impose conditions on the
sale of the essential components of its patented products does not
mean that it actually did so here. To the contrary, Defendant's
purchase of microprocessors and chipsets from Intel was in no way
conditioned on their agreement not to combine the Intel
microprocessors and chipsets with other non-Intel parts and then
sell the resultant products. Nor does the fact that Intel informed its
customers that its license with LGE "does not extend, expressly or
by implication, to any product that [they] may make by combining
an Intel product with any non-Intel product" render conditional the
sales from Intel to Defendants. 76
Thus, for a restriction to negate exhaustion, it must be clear that the
purchaser fully understood the restriction and acquiesced. The facts
of LGE were such that no reasonable purchaser would have
acquiesced; to do so would have left the purchaser with
microprocessors having no real use.
7 7
With the increased assertion of the patent exhaustion doctrine in
recent years, it is likely that licensors have begun including more
limitations, restrictions and attempted disclaimers in their license
agreements hoping to avoid exhaustion. Under the essential features
standard of Univis Lens, these attempts will fail if they constitute an
attempt to impermissibly broaden the scope of the patent grant. The
Mallinckrodt decision is consistent with this conclusion.
75. Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 846 F. Supp. 522, 538-39 (E.D. Tex. 1994), affd without
op., 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
76. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916-17 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
77. Note that the "meeting of the minds" aspect of a restriction on patented goods is
separate and apart from whether the restriction is within the scope of the patent grant.
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C. Exhaustion Does Not Extend to Reconstruction of a Patented
Entity
The purchaser of a patented article has the same rights as any
purchaser of personal property, "including the right to use it, repair it,
modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions
of the sale.",78 "However, the rights of ownership do not include the
right to construct an essentially new article on the template of the
original, for the right to make the article remains with the patentee. 79
The Supreme Court firmly established the principle of
permissible repair in its Aro v. Convertible Top decision:
The decisions of this Court require the conclusion that
reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented
elements, is limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to
"in fact make a new article," after the entity, viewed as a whole,
has become spent. In order to call the monopoly, conferred by the
patent grant, into play for a second time, it must, indeed, be a
second creation of the patented entity .... Mere replacement of
individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part
repeatedly or different parts successively, is no more than the
lawful right of the owner to repair his property.
80
Repair is "the disassembly and cleaning of patented articles
accompanied by replacement of unpatented parts that had become
worn or spent, in order to preserve the utility for which the article was
originally intended., 81  Reconstruction requires extensive reworking
82of the article such that there is a re-creation of the patented entity.
The Federal Circuit has recognized and acknowledged that the
repair/reconstruction doctrine stems from the doctrine of patent
exhaustion:
78. Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Inc., 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872).
79. Id.
80. Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961)
(citations omitted).
81. See Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1103-04; Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422
(1964) (extensive refurbishment of fish-canning machines was repair because useful life of
machine was extended); General Elec. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (large
scale overhauling of gun mounts was repair because assembly-line method was simply more
efficient way to refurbish individual mounts); Dana Corp. v. Am. Precision Co., 827 F.2d 755
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (repair of used clutches was contemplated by the patentee); Everpure, Inc. v.
Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (replacement of entire cartridge containing spent filter
was permissible repair), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
82. Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at I104-05.
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Underlying the repair/reconstruction dichotomy is the principle of
exhaustion of the patent right. The unrestricted sale of a patented
article, by or with the authority of the patentee, "exhausts" the
patentee's right to control further sale and use of that article by
enforcing the patent under which it was first sold .... Thus when a
patented device has been lawfully sold in the United States,
subsequent purchasers inherit the same immunity under the
doctrine of patent exhaustion. However, the prohibition that the
product may not be the vehicle for a "second creation of the
patented entity" continues to apply, for such re-creation exceeds
the rights that accompanied the initial sale.
83
Thus, consistent with the Aro v. Convertible Top line of cases,
exhaustion only applies to the actual article sold, rather than an article
reconstructed after the original entity is deemed spent when viewed as
a whole.
8 4
IV. DOUBLE ROYALTIES: THE SINE QUA NON OF PATENT
EXHAUSTION
Pursuant to Univis Lens and its progeny, combination patents are
not exhausted unless and until a full royalty is recovered for practice
of such patents. There can be a legitimate assertion of exhaustion
only under such conditions. Precluding a double recovery for practice
of a patent claim will thus obviate the applicability of the patent
exhaustion doctrine.
A. The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion Does Not Preclude
Collection of Separate Royalties for Practice of Separate and
Distinct Patent Claims
Neither Univis Lens, Cyrix v. Intel nor any other case the author
is aware of, applies the doctrine of patent exhaustion to prevent a
patentee from collecting royalties for practice of separate and distinct
component and combination claims. To the contrary, numerous cases
recognize a patentee's right to separate royalties for separate and
83. Id.at 1105.
84. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)
(replacement of worn fabric top was permissible repair of patented combination of fabric
convertible top and associated metal support structure); Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121
F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reconstruction where patented drill bit was recreated by construction
of an entirely new cutting tip after existing tip could no longer be resharpened and reused, i.e.,
repaired), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1040 (1998); Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862
F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reconstruction where cutter wheels were material part of patented
invention).
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distinct claims, even if the component has no substantial use other
than in a patented combination.
1. Univis Lens Does Not Prohibit Separate Royalties
For Separate And Distinct Patent Claims
The Supreme Court did not hold in Univis Lens 85 that the
patentee could not contractually require the secondary licensee to pay
additional royalties. There was no attempt by the patentee to collect
"additional royalties" from a secondary licensee. As the Court
observed, "[t]he rewards of the corporate appellees for the
exploitation of the patents and the patented lenses are derived wholly
from the sales by the Lens Company of the blanks .... , 86 Moreover,
the Court explicitly refused to hold that further royalties could not
have been recovered from the lens finisher:
In the present case the entire consideration and compensation for
both [lens blank and finishing process] is the purchase price paid
by the finishing licensee to the Lens Company. We have no
question here of what other stipulations, for royalties or otherwise,
might have been exacted as a part of the entire transaction, which
do not seek to control the disposition of the patented article after
the sale.
87
The patentee in Univis Lens could seemingly have included in its
license agreements provision for payment of royalties for both the
lens blank and practice of the finishing process without running afoul
of the Supreme Court's prohibition of post-sale control if the
arrangement was part of the entire transaction and no double royalty
was recovered.
Moreover, Univis Lens did not involve patentably distinct
component, combination or method claims.
The record gives no account of the prior art and does not provide
us with other material to which, if available, resort might
appropriately be had in determining the nature of the alleged
invention and the validity and scope of the patent claims founded
upon it. In any event, we find it unnecessary, in the circumstances
of this case, to decide whether, as the court below held, the patent
claims can rightly be said to include the finishing of the blanks.
85. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
86. Id. at 245.
87. Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
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As appellees concede, the invention of only a single lens patent is
utilized in making each blank and finishing it as a lens.
88
The lens company's concession obviated the necessity of determining
the scope of the claims, and thus whether the component,
combination, and method claims were patentably distinct. Without
such a concession, it is clear the Court could not have made its
"essential features" determination without an examination of the prior
art and determination of claim scope.
2. Cyrix v. Intel Did Not Involve Separate And Distinct
Component And Combination Claims
In Cyrix v. Intel, as discussed above,89 the district court found the
claims to be coextensive because they included the essential features
of the invention as claimed elements. 90 The court found that memory
management features embodied in a microprocessor component claim
were also essential features of a combination claim directed to the
microprocessor with external memory. 9' The patentee was thus not
entitled to a separate royalty for practice of the combination claim in
addition to a royalty on the component.92 The Cyrix v. Intel decision
thus turned on claim construction based on a review of the
prosecution history and prior art; it says nothing about the ability of a
patentee to collect royalties for practice of separate and distinct patent
claims.
The Cyrix v. Intel decision has been misconstrued to mean that
every article transferred in an authorized and unconditional manner is
thereafter free to be "used" in its "intended" manner. 93 However, it is
clear from the Stukenborg line of cases discussed below, if an
apparatus or method patent claim is patentably distinct from a
separate claim covering the article sold, there is no exhaustion of the
apparatus or method claim, even if there is no use for the article
88. Id. at 248.
89. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
90. 846 F. Supp. at 534 ("[T]he combination of segmentation plus paging are essential
features of claims I [component], 2 [combination], and 6 [combination] of the '338 Patent.")
(emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 539-40.
93. E.g., Robert W. Morris, "Another Pound of Flesh ": Is There A Conflict Between The
Patent Exhaustion Doctrine and Licensing Agreements?, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1557, 1595
(1995) ("Despite Intel's stipulation to the contrary, the court held that Cyrix's computer chips
infringed Intel's claim 1, but found that the chips had no use unless they were combined with
external memory as described by Intel's claims 2 and 6.").
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except to be used in the infringing combination or method. If the
combination claims in Cyrix v. Intel had been directed to subject
matter patentably distinct from the microprocessor, for example a
particular type of memory function whose essential features were not
incorporated in the microprocessor, no one could reasonably argue
that the memory claims were exhausted. The Cyrix v. Intel decision
can thus be understood as allowing the combination of the
microprocessor with generic memory capable of performing the
inherent functions recited in the microprocessor claim,94 but not
extending to separately patented inventions directed to the memory
itself.
3. There Is No Authority For The Proposition That A
Separate And Distinct System Or Combination Claim
Is Exhausted By The Authorized Sale Of A Component
In view of the abundance of authority holding that separate and
distinct claims are independently enforceable, the district court in
Cyrix v. Intel would have been compelled to come to a different
conclusion if the component and combination claims had been
patentably distinct:
Each claim of a patent gives to the patentee an exclusive right.
The mere fact that a person has an implied license to use a device
that is covered by one set of claims does not give the person an
implied license to use the device in combination with other devices
in which the combination is covered by another set of claims.
95
In fact, the Federal Circuit held in Tieleman v. Stork that separate and
distinct component and combination patent rights are independently
enforceable, even if the component is a nonstaple article which has no
substantial use other than in the patented combination:
The permissible repair principle does not apply, however, to the
manufacture, use, or sale of a separately patented replacement part.
Here, the probe is separately covered by claims 1-3, and the
94. 846 F. Supp. at 538.
95. Stukenborg v. United States, 372 F.2d 498, 504 (Ct. Cl. 1967); accord Priebe & Sons
Co. v. Hunt, 188 F.2d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 1951) ("The patent grants conferred upon the patentee
the right to a monoply [sic] on each claim with the right to exact compensation in respect
thereto."), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 801 (1951); Hunt v. Armour & Co., 185 F.2d 722, 729 (7th
Cir. 1951). ("Defendant argues that the sale of a patented article exhausts the monopoly in that
article.... Apparently it is defendant's view that by purchasing fingers, which are covered by
one group of claims in the patent, it automatically also obtained a license under the separate
group of machine claims. However, each claim of a patent constitutes a separate grant of
monopoly.").
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district court found that Stork's sale of probes directly infringed
these claims .... [T]he injunction is not overly broad to the extent
that it enjoins Stork from making, using, or selling replacement
probes that would infringe any of claims 1-3 of the '050 patent.
96
In addition to the Federal Circuit's statement in Tieleman v.
Stork and the appellate decisions cited above, numerous earlier
district court cases have recognized the independent enforceability of
a claim covering a component or article which has no use other than
to practice a separate and distinct combination or method claim. For
example, in Warner, the court held that:
To supply patented parts of a patented combination without
authority from the patentee to purchasers of the combination is a
direct infringement of the claims of the patent on the part and a
contributory infringement of the claims of the patent on the
combination, assuming that the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c)
are otherwise met [e.g., nonstaple article] .... The very fact that the
patentee of a patented combination bothers to secure a patent upon
a component part of that combination negates any inference that in
selling the combination he contemplates or intends licensing such
purchaser to replace the patented part from any source other than
himself.
97
Separately, in United Nickel, the court noted:
The fact that they purchased from authorized agents this solution
which enables them to nickel plate, does not, inferentially or
otherwise, authorize them to use it in nickel plating without
obtaining a license to use the invention covered by the other
claims. They must also get a license to use the inventions covered
by the other claims, or they cannot use this without being liable as
infringers. Each claim is, in effect, a separate and distinct patent;
and the right to use one patent does not carry with it the right to
use the others without a further license .... The selling of the
solution does not authorize, inferentially or otherwise, the use of it
for the purpose of nickel plating, whatever else it may be used for
[other uses irrelevant], without also procuring a license to nickel
96. Tieleman Food Equip., B.V. v. Stork Gamco, Inc., 56 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (citation omitted) (upholding injunction against sale of separately patented replacement
parts even though patentee's rights in combination claims had been exhausted), withdrawn from
bound volume, 62 F.3d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (the Federal Circuit panel apparently felt there was
nothing precedential about its opinion, i.e., that it was consistent with established precedent,
which is precisely the point).
97. Warner & Swasey Co. v. Held, 256 F. Supp. 303, 311 (E.D. Wisc. 1966); accord
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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plate under the first and fourth claims, which are separate
inventions.
98
Separate royalties are thus recoverable under the patent law for
separate and distinct component and combination claims, no matter
what other use the component may or may not have. Neither Univis
Lens nor its progeny, including Cyrix v. Intel and LGE, hold or imply
the opposite. Any royalty recovered for a separately patented
component must be presumed, based on the cases cited above, to be
payment for practice of the component claim and not for practice of a
separate and distinct combination claim. A showing that the
component and combination claims are indeed not patentably distinct
would be required to overcome the presumption and thus indicate that
the exhaustion doctrine should apply.
B. Under Univis Lens, a Combination Claim is Exhausted by the
Sale of a Component if the Component Embodies Essential
Features of the Claimed Invention
Both Univis Lens and Cyrix v. Intel are typically cited for the
proposition that a patentee is precluded from collecting a second
royalty for practice of a patent claim directed to a combination if a
royalty has been paid on any component which is used in the
combination. However, neither these cases nor any others of which
the author is aware, support such a general proposition. The instances
of exhaustion found in both Univis Lens and Cyrix v. Intel were the
result of the authorized sale of components embodying the invention
of combination claims rather than just any component used in the
combination. In both cases, the component was patentably indistinct
from the claimed combination, or, in the case of Univis Lens,
patentably indistinct from a claimed process or combination.
In Univis Lens, the lens blank embodied essential features of a
lens, to which the patent was quintessentially directed.99 In Cyrix v.
Intel, the microprocessor embodied essential features of a memory
management system which included on-chip paging circuitry and the
capability to switch between segmentation alone or segmentation in
combination with paging. As discussed above, the addition of
memory was not an essential feature because it was not used to
98. United Nickel Co. v. California Elec. Works, 25 F. 475, 479 (D. Cal. 1885) (emphasis
added).
99. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc. 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942).
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distinguish over the prior art.100 Thus, Univis Lens and Cyrix v. Intel
stand for the proposition that the licensed sale of a component
embodying the patentably distinct features of a claimed process or
combination exhausts the patent monopoly with regard to such patent.
A broader reading of the cases is neither warranted nor necessary to a
proper understanding or application of the exhaustion doctrine.
But, if the component is covered by a separate and distinct patent
claim, there is no exhaustion under Univis Lens because, by
definition, the component and combination claims do not share the
same essential features. A combination or process claim can only be
exhausted by virtue of the purchase of a component if the features of
the pertinent claim distinguishing it over the prior art are embodied in
the component, i.e., the component is not patentably distinct from the
combination or process.
Thus, if the essential features of a combination patent are not
completely embodied in a component purchased from a licensed
supplier, the combination patent cannot be exhausted by that sale. If
the essential features of a patented combination or method are
completely embodied in the licensed component, there is exhaustion
of the combination or method patent because the claims are not
separate and distinct.
C. Precluding Recovery of Double Royalties Precludes the
Applicability of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine
If there is no attempt to collect double royalties or otherwise
engage in prohibited post-sale control, the issue of patent exhaustion
never legitimately arises. If a patentee merely collects separate
royalties for practice of separate and distinct patent claims, there is no
collection of double royalties. As discussed above,10 t the collection
of a royalty for a patented component does not exhaust a separate and
distinct combination claim. Moreover, recovery of a royalty for
practice of a combination claim is not double recovery where the
purchased component, whether or not the component is patented, does
not embody all of the essential features of the combination claim.
However, if a component embodies all of the essential features
of a combination claim, the authorized sale of such component
exhausts the combination claim, whether or not the component is
100. 846 F. Supp. at 534 ("[T]he ability to chose between the prior art segmentation alone
and the combination of segmentation plus paging are essential features of claims I [component],
2 [combination], and 6 [combination] of the '338 Patent.").
101. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
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patented. Thus, to avoid the possibility of exhaustion, no attempt
should be made to collect a royalty for practice of a combination
claim if the purchaser bought the component from a licensed source
and the component embodies all of the essential features of the
combination claim. Adhering to this rule will preclude the assertion
of any legitimate patent exhaustion argument pursuant to the
principles of Univis Lens.
V. ESSENTIAL FEATURES ARE PATENTABLY DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
In Univis Lens, the lens blank embodied essential features of a
lens, which was the subject of at least one of the asserted patents. 102
As discussed in detail above, 10 3 the district court in Cyrix v. Intel,
relying on Univis Lens, found the component and combination claims
to be coextensive because they all included the essential features of
the invention as elements.' °4 The claimed microprocessor component
embodied essential features of a memory management system which
included on-chip paging circuitry and the capability to switch
between segmentation alone or segmentation in combination with
paging. The court in Cyrix v. Intel characterized as essential features
what was stated as distinguishing over prior art, i.e., patentably
distinct features. 05 The patentably distinct features were inherently
embodied in the microprocessor. 10 6 The addition of memory was not
an essential feature because it was not used to distinguish over the
prior art.'
0 7
Thus, an essential feature is necessarily a patentably distinct
feature. This standard has long been well known to patent
practitioners:
It is settled law that a party might be entitled to a patent for a
combination [because of the cooperation of the elements contained
102. 316 U.S. at 249.
103. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
104. 846 F. Supp. at 534. Specifically, the court noted that:
[t]he Intel 80286 microprocessor had on-chip segmentation circuitry and required
external memory to be operable. The advance of the '338 Patent over the
memory management system used on the 80286 microprocessor was the addition
of on-chip paging circuitry... and the ability to choose between the prior art
segmentation alone and the combination of segmentation plus paging are
essential features of claims I [component], 2 [combination], and 6 [combination]
of the '338 Patent.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 538.
107. Id. at 534.
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therein], and at the same time be entitled to a separate patent for
one of the elements of the combination. In such a case, the
question to be determined is whether two or more different
inventive concepts are involved. If the claims are so related that
the separately claimed element constitutes the essential
distinguishing feature of the combination as claimed, different
concepts are not involved, the inventions are not distinct, and
double patenting will be found. Conversely, where the element
does not constitute the sole distinguishing novelty in the
combination the inventions are distinct and double patenting will
not be found.
10 8
It is important to realize that the above-cited law, primarily from
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), the predecessor
of the Federal Circuit, reflects the common usage of the terminology
"essential features" at the time of the Supreme Court's Univis Lens
decision. For example, In re Coleman, a CCPA case from 1951,
stated with respect to essential features "[i]f the claims are so related
that the separately claimed element constitutes the essential
distinguishing feature of the combination as claimed, different
concepts are not involved, the inventions are not distinct, and double
patenting will be found." 10 9 In re Coleman in turn relied on Palmer
Tire v. Lozier, a Sixth Circuit decision from 1898, which was replete
with essential features language and even touched on the notion of
noninfringing use:
One cannot extract an essential element of his claimed invention
from a former patent, without which the former patent would not
have been granted, and make it the subject of a subsequent
patent .... [I]f the second patent is for a distinct and separate
invention, or to put the matter another way, has not been made
integral with another invention already patented, so as to be fairly
necessary to its use, it should be sustained .... [T]he essential
108. In re Homeman, 92 U.S.P.Q. 316, 319 (CCPA 1952) (alterations in original)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also In re Carlton, 77 F.2d 363, 365 (CCPA 1935)
("[T]he mere fact that appellant included in his patented combination the element or
composition of matter here involved, does not preclude him from receiving a patent for the
composition of matter defined by the appealed claims."); Inre Ferenci, 83 F.2d 279, 283 (CCPA
1936) ("Under some circumstances an element may be patentable per se, if new, and also form a
part of a patentable combination with other elements, whether this element is new or old, and
yet the two inventions may be distinct and not entitled to protection in the same patent."); In re
Hadsel, 173 F.2d 1010 (CCPA 1949); Palmer Tire Co. v. Lozier, 90 F. 732, 744 (6th Cir. 1898)
("One cannot extract an essential element of his invention from a former patent, without which
the former patent would not have been granted, and make it the subject of a subsequent patent");
In re Hawkins, 57 F.2d 367 (CCPA 1932); In re Creveling, 46 App. D.C. 536 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
109. In re Coleman, 189 F.2d 976, 979 (CCPA 1951) (emphasis added).
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feature of the invention was the devising of the newfabric .... and
making it a constituent part of his "bicycle and other tubing."
Indeed, the tubing would not have been patentable at all without it,
for it would have been nothing more.. .than had already been
patented. 1
10
Thus, the contemporaneous caselaw regarding the standard for
patentable distinctiveness from the era preceding the Univis Lens
decision informs the meaning intended by the Supreme Court when it
used the "essential features" terminology. A careful reading of this
caselaw as well as the Univis Lens decision itself makes abundantly
clear that the term essential features was intended by the Supreme
Court to mean patentably distinct features.
A "reasonable noninfringing uses" analysis is also relevant,
pursuant to Univis Lens, to determining the essential features of a
patent claim, and thus, whether the claim is exhausted. As stated in
Univis Lens and subsequent caselaw, an article embodying the
invention cannot be used without practicing the invention. Thus, a
component which includes the essential features is, for all intents and
purposes, the invention itself, and collection of a single royalty for
that component is all that is allowed by law. That is, a component
which includes the essential features of an invention clearly cannot be
used without practicing the invention, i.e., has no reasonable
noninfringing uses.
Notwithstanding these conclusions, caution should be exercised
when conducting a noninfringing uses inquiry as part of an exhaustion
analysis. As discussed above, if claims are patentably distinct from
the article sold, there is no exhaustion even if there are no reasonable
noninfringing uses. i l ' This circumstance has made the exhaustion
analysis seem unnecessarily amorphous. However, a focus on
patentable distinctiveness consistent with Univis Lens would avoid
the confusion evident in much of the prior caselaw and commentary
on exhaustion.
Making a determination as to the patentably distinctive features,
and thus the essential features of a patent claim as part of an
exhaustion analysis, requires at least some level of claim construction
as well as an examination of the prosecution history and prior art.
110. Palmer Tire Co. v. Lozier, 90 F. 732, 739-44 (6th Cir. 1898) (emphasis added).
111. Stukenborg v. United States, 372 F.2d 498, 504 (Ct. Cl. 1967); accord Priebe & Sons
Co. v. Hunt, 188 F.2d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 1951); Hunt v. Armour & Co., 185 F.2d 722, 729 (7th
Cir. 1951); Tieleman Food Equip., B.V. v. Stork Gamco, Inc., 56 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Warner & Swasey Co. v. Held, 256 F. Supp. 303, 311 (E.D. Wisc. 1966); Dennison Mfg.
Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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However, this is no more onerous than the claim construction already
required under Markrman v. Westview Instruments"2 in every patent
case. All patent infringement cases hinge on a determination of what
is actually encompassed by a claim. There is no legitimate reason for
an exhaustion analysis to be any less rigorous, particularly since
exhaustion applies to the authorized sale of an article embodying a
claimed invention. There is no way to determine whether an article
embodies a claimed invention without determining what the claimed
invention is. Unfortunately, some courts have glossed over the
necessity of a rigorous analysis of claim scope and have instead
viewed the exhaustion doctrine as a sort of shorthand way to decide
the extent of patent rights without performing a thorough patent
analysis. The LGE court's conclusion, as discussed below in Section
VI.D, that method claims, per se, cannot be exhausted is one such
example.
An essential features analysis cannot be at odds with a
Mallinckrodt13 determination as to lawful restrictions on the sale of
an article. However, there is no inherent conflict between Univis
Lens and Mallinckrodt. If a patent claim is not embodied in an article
sold, exhaustion is not an issue and a Mallinckrodt type analysis is
inapposite. If a patent claim is embodied in an article sold, a
Mallinckrodt analysis would conclude that it is not reasonably within
the patent grant to collect double royalties on the same claimed
invention, but may be acceptable to otherwise place a restriction on
the sale, e.g., limiting to single use. In no event however, would a
Mallinckrodt analysis result in the allowance of two separate royalties
for practice of the same patent claim.
VI. THE PATENT EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE SHOULD APPLY TO A
METHOD OR PROCESS CLAIM IF THE ARTICLE SOLD EMBODIES
THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE CLAIM
There is no legitimate basis for distinguishing between apparatus
and method claims in the context of patent exhaustion. Such a
distinction is at odds with Supreme Court precedent, other legal
112. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (claim construction is
exclusively within the province of the court).
113. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted) ("Unless the condition violates some other law or policy in the patent field, notably the
misuse or antitrust law, private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of
sale.").
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doctrines, the statutory contributory infringement standard, and it
conflicts with established patent prosecution practice.
A. The Federal Circuit's Statements Regarding Inapplicability
of the Exhaustion Doctrine to Method Claims were
Unnecessary
The Federal Circuit, citing Univis Lens and Masonite, stated in
Bandag that a method claim, per se, cannot be exhausted:
The doctrine that the first sale by a patentee of an article
embodying his invention exhausts his patent rights in that article,
[citations omitted], is inapplicable here, because the claims of the
Carver patent are directed to a "method of retreading" and cannot
read on the equipment Bolser used in its cold process recapping.
114
Other than the citations to Univis Lens and Masonite, no basis was
provided for the statement in Bandag nor was any analysis put forth.
The Federal Circuit repeated its Bandag statement, again with no
supporting analysis, in Glass Equipment. 15  While the ultimate
holdings of Bandag and Glass Equipment appear to be correct on the
facts of those cases, the general statement regarding patent exhaustion
is highly problematic. More importantly, as discussed below, the
Federal Circuit's reliance on Univis Lens for the proposition that
method claims cannot be exhausted was improper because a method
claim was in fact held exhausted by the Supreme Court in Univis
Lens.
In Bandag, the claimed method was directed to removing
trapped air bubbles during a tire retreading operation. The tire
retreading equipment involved was not separately patented and was
114. Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted) (holding first sale doctrine inapplicable where equipment for retreading tires
was sold but patent claimed method of using equipment for retreading tires).
115. The Federal Circuit stated:
This case does not involve the so-called "first sale" doctrine, as was argued to,
and thus discussed by, the district court. The first sale doctrine stands for the
proposition that, absent unusual circumstances, courts infer that a patent owner
has given up the right to exclude concerning a patented article that the owner
sells. Here, where the articles sold were corner keys, which are not themselves
patented (they are merely embodiments of an unpatented element of the '195
patent claims), and the license issue concerns GED's right to exclude concerning
the method patent, not the apparatus patent, the first sale doctrine is inapplicable
to the analysis of the facts.
Glass Equip. Dev. Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1342 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration in
original) (quoting Bandag, 750 F.2d at 924).
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not covered by the patent at issue. 16 However, the Federal Circuit, in
reversing the district court's holding of implied license," 17 found that
the equipment had noninfringing uses, 118 which, under an essential
features analysis, is tantamount to a finding that the claimed invention
is not embodied in the article sold. The Federal Circuit determined
that the apparatus could be used in a noninfringing manner, and thus,
there was no finding that the essential features of the claimed method
were included in the machine sold." 9  The exhaustion decision in
Bandag might have been based on the fact that there were
noninfringing uses for the equipment without the broad assertion that
the patent exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable to method claims. The
Federal Circuit ultimately held in Bandag that no implied license was
conferred both because the equipment had reasonable noninfringing
uses and because the circumstances surrounding the sale did not
indicate that a license should be implied. 120  The only rigorous
analysis in Bandag thus involved implied license and not exhaustion.
In Glass Equipment, the claimed method was directed to
constructing spacer frame assemblies using a linear extruding
machine. The spacer frame assembly apparatus was separately
patented. The assertion of implied license was based on the purchase
of folding, locking comer keys that were elements of the apparatus
patent. The Federal Circuit, in reversing the district court's holding
of implied license,' 2' held that no implied license was conferred
because the comer keys had reasonable noninfringing uses other than
in the claimed method. 122 In fact, the purchased comer keys had been
116. The court explicitly pointed out that the patent in question was not directed to
equipment for performing the claimed method. Bandag, 750 F.2d at 922.
117. The district court disposition involved the implied license doctrine even though it
discussed "first sale." Thus, there were no issues on appeal directed to patent exhaustion.
118. The issue was whether the tire retreading equipment was specifically designed to
practice the patented retreading method and thus whether there was an implied license to
practice the method. The patent assignee, Bandag, presented evidence of potential
noninfringing uses including reselling the retreading equipment, modifying the equipment so
that it could be used as replacement parts and refraining from using the equipment until the
patent expired (eighteen months). Bandag, 750 F.2d at 922-23, 925.
119. Id. at 924.
120. Id. at 924-26.
121. Like Bandag, the district court disposition in Glass Equipment involved the implied
license doctrine. Thus, there were no issues on appeal implicating the patent exhaustion
doctrine.
122. Glass Equip. Dev. Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1342 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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used in a noninfringing manner. 123  As in Bandag, there was no
rigorous exhaustion analysis in Glass Equipment, just a broad
statement that the first sale doctrine was inapplicable to method
claims.
It is clear that the Federal Circuit's statements regarding the
patent exhaustion doctrine in Bandag and Glass Equipment exalted
form over substance, and were not necessary to the proper resolutions
of those cases. In both cases, the article sold had reasonable
noninfringing uses and thus could not have embodied the essential
features of the claimed methods. An analysis based on Univis Lens
would have reached the correct conclusion on exhaustion in both
cases without relying on a distinction between apparatus and method
claims.
B. The Supreme Court Held Method Claims Exhausted in Univis
Lens
The general statement in Bandag and Glass Equipment as to the
inapplicability of the patent exhaustion doctrine to method claims is at
odds with Univis Lens. In Univis Lens, the sale of a lens blank
exhausted claims to a finishing process in at least one of the patents at
issue. One of the patents held exhausted, U.S. Patent No. 1,879,769
to Silverman, was directed to a method for eliminating prismatic
imbalance and contained no apparatus claims.
The Supreme Court drew no distinction between apparatus and
method claims in Univis Lens and explicitly referred to exhaustion of
the claimed finishing "procedure." The Court held that the "[s]ale of
a lens blank by the patentee or by his licensee is thus in itself both a
complete transfer of ownership of the blank, which is within the
protection of the patent law, and a license to practice the final stage of
the patent procedure."' 24 Any statements or holdings to the effect that
the patent exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable to method claims,
including the statements in the Federal Circuit's Bandag and Glass
Equipment decisions, are thus at odds with the Supreme Court's
holding in Univis Lens. 125
123. Id. at 1340 ("Simonton, a manufacturer of insulated glass windows, bought folding,
locking comer keys from Allmetal for a period of time before 1988 and used the keys to make
spacer frames by a method that did not infringe the '582 method patent.").
124. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942).
125. At least one other court has held method claims exhausted:
Because PSC paid a royalty for the license of the patent rights under the '297 or
'186 patents, Symbol's rights under those patents were extinguished, and Symbol
forfeited its right to collect any additional royalties on any product that practiced
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C. A Distinction Between Apparatus and Method Claims is
Inconsistent with the Statutory Contributory Infringement
Standard
The Supreme Court's statements in Univis Lens regarding
contributory infringement buttress the view expressed herein that
exhaustion should apply to method claims if the article sold embodies
the essential features of the method claims. The Supreme Court
assumed in Univis Lens that "sale of the blanks by an unlicensed
manufacturer to an unlicensed finisher for their completion would
constitute contributory infringement."' 12 6 The Court thus recognized
that the "no substantial noninfringing uses" requirement of the
statutory contributory infringement standard 127 must be consistent
with, if not the same as, the noninfringing uses analysis associated
with exhaustion. Importantly, under the explicit language of the
statute, a method claim can be contributorily infringed by the sale of a
component useful only in practicing the claimed method. 28 There is
no restriction to combination or system claims in the context of
contributory infringement. Thus, to maintain consistency pursuant to
Univis Lens between the exhaustion and contributory infringement
standards, there can be no exclusion of method claims from the
exhaustion doctrine.
It has been opined that recent caselaw dealing with exhaustion
adversely affects the contributory infringement standard:
Where patent exhaustion applies, the standard for determining
whether an implied license arose is necessary use....
any claim under the '297 or '186 patents and used a PSC scan engine. Its
attempts to collect royalties from two parties for the same product violates the
exhaustion doctrine ....
PSC, Inc. v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (emphasis
added). In PSC v. Symbol, one of the patents at issue, the '186 patent, contained method claims.
The Court drew no distinction between method and apparatus claims and held all claims
exhausted. Moreover, as discussed infra, the Federal Circuit has held that the doctrine of
permissible repair is based on exhaustion and applies to process or method claims.
126. 316 U.S. at 249.
127. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c):
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
128. Id.
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By instructing future courts that an implied license
[exhaustion] arises unless every component in a patented
combination passes a "no noninfringing use" test, the Universal
Electronics opinion eviscerates congressional intent to protect
patent owners from contributory infringement.... This case forces
the patent owner to make two inconsistent arguments: (1) the
product has no substantial noninfringing use for purposes of
proving contributory infringement; and (2) the product has
noninfringing uses for purposes of proving that the patent owner
did not grant the purchaser an implied license. 1
29
This concern is not well founded, however, in light of the essential
features dictate of Univis Lens as discussed above. If patent claims
are patentably distinct from the article sold, there is no exhaustion
under an essential features analysis even if there are no reasonable
noninfringing uses for the article. Focusing on the essential features,
i.e., the patentably distinct features, avoids the erroneous conclusion
that exhaustion occurs simply if there are no noninfringing uses and
thus avoids the perceived conflict with the contributory infringement
standard.
D. The District Court in LGE Followed the Statements of
Bandag and Glass Equipment to Erroneously Conclude that
Method Claims were not Exhausted
In LGE v. Asustek, the District Court for the Northern District of
California concluded that method claims, per se, could not be
exhausted and thus summarily disposed of an exhaustion contention
without analyzing the patent claims themselves. The district court
blindly followed the general statement of Bandag and Glass
Equipment to hold that method claims were not exhausted even
though it had held apparatus claims directed to the same subject
matter were exhausted.
1 30
129. Michael J. Swope, Recent Developments in Patent Law: Implied License-An
Emerging Threat to Contributory Infringement Protection, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 281, 300, 303
(1995).
130. The court stated:
LGE argues that the patent exhaustion doctrine does not preclude it from alleging
infringement of its method claims. In this, LGE is correct, as the Court stated in
its August 20 Order. August 20 Order at 18-20 (noting that Bandag, Inc. v. Al
Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Glass Equip. Dev.,
Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) hold that the sale of a device
cannot exhaust the patentee's rights under a separate patent teaching a method of
accomplishing a specific function).
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The LGE court relied on the essential features dictate of Univis
Lens to properly conclude that apparatus claims were exhausted.
However, there was no factual or legal basis for differentiating
between apparatus and method claims based simply on claim format.
Comparison of the analogous apparatus and method claims in the
patents at issue in LGE shows that many, if not all, were directed to
virtually identical subject matter; the only real difference being the
claim format. The court did not bother to examine the claims to
determine whether there was any patentable difference, i.e., whether
the essential features of the invention were included in both apparatus
and method claims. The court's oversight is particularly troublesome
considering that some of the apparatus claims were drafted in
"means" language, i.e., prescribing a particular function, and were
virtually identical to their method counterparts.
For example, LGE's Lagoy U. S. Patent No. 4,918,645 was
directed to a "computer bus having page mode memory access."
Independent claim 1, an apparatus claim held exhausted by the district
court, recited three "means" elements--(1) means for detecting a
request for initiating an access to a memory, (2) means for asserting a
plurality of memory address control signals, and (3) means for
detecting a completion of the access to the memory. Independent
claim 12, a method claim held not exhausted by the district court,
recited virtually identical steps of (1) detecting a request from a
requesting agent for initiating an access to said memory . . . (2)
asserting a plurality of memory address control signals ...and (3)
detecting a logic state of an end of access system bus control signal
that indicates a completion of the access to the memory. Both claims
further recited that memory address control signals were asserted by
asserting the row address indicative of a page of data and thereafter
asserting and denying a plurality of times the column address strobe
signal in conjunction with a plurality of column addresses for
performing a page mode type of memory access. The common
distinction relied on during prosecution for patentability over all prior
art references was the "page mode type of access over a system bus
from a requesting agent to a replying agent."' 31 The apparatus and
LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003)..
131. For example, in response to an obviousness rejection of claims I and 12, the
applicant's attorney responded:
[lit can be seen that there is no disclosure in these three references that would
make obvious under 35 USC 103 a page mode type of access over a system bus
from a requesting agent to a replying agent. As a result, independent Claims I
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method claims both included the "page mode type of memory access"
limitation. However, the district court held the apparatus claim
exhausted but the method claim not exhausted even though the claims
were admittedly directed to the same subject matter.
The LGE court failed to properly apply Univis Lens to the facts
before it and as a result reached the wrong conclusion regarding
exhaustion of the method claims. If the court had focused on the
holding of Univis Lens, and not the erroneous statements from
Bandag and Glass Equipment, the mistake could have been avoided.
E. The Repair/Reconstruction Doctrine is at Odds with the
Federal Circuit's Statements in the Bandag and Glass
Equipment Cases
As discussed above,1 32 the Federal Circuit has recognized that
the doctrine of permissible repair is based on the doctrine of patent
exhaustion.133 The Federal Circuit went on to state in Jazz Photo:
The defense of repair is applicable to process claims, as well as to
apparatus claims, when the patented process was used in the
United States and the patent right has been exhausted for the
articles produced thereby. Thus, when the same process was used,
the patent right for that process was exhausted upon the LFFP's
first sale in the United States.
134
In Hewlett Packard v. Repeat-O-Type,135 the Federal Circuit also held
that patent exhaustion applies to method claims. This case also
involved application of the permissible repair doctrine. Thus, since
the Federal Circuit has recognized that the defense of repair is
applicable to process (method) claims and that the
repair/reconstruction doctrine is based on exhaustion, it was the
height of inconsistency for the Federal Circuit to state in Bandag and
and 12 are believed to patentably distinguish over this combination of references
and to thus be allowable over these references.
Prosecution of app. Ser. No. 07/098,449; U.S. Pat. No. 4,918,645; Response To Office Action;
July 19, 1989; p. 18. The applicant thus explicitly recognized that there was no patentable
distinction between apparatus claim 1 and method claim 12.
132. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
133. Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Inc., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("[U]nderlying the repair/reconstruction dichotomy is the principle of exhaustion of the
patent right.").
134. Id. at 1108-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
135. Hewlett Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1455
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Glass Equipment that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to
method claims.
There is no discernible reason for excluding method claims from
the exhaustion doctrine where the sale of an article embodying the
claimed invention is involved, but holding the doctrine applicable to
method claims where repair/reconstruction is at issue. Yet the
Federal Circuit has done just that. Whether the line was drawn
knowingly or unknowingly does not matter. The distinction cannot
properly exist under the Supreme Court's exhaustion rationale as
stated in Univis Lens. A distinction is not warranted on any basis. A
strict reliance on the essential features dictate of Univis Lens as
advocated here would unify and make consistent the application of
the classical exhaustion doctrine (resale of an article embodying the
claimed invention), the repair/reconstruction doctrine, the statutory
standard for contributory infringement, and as discussed below, the
implied license doctrine.
F. Writing a Claim in Method Format Does Not Create
Patentable Distinctiveness
It is customary and accepted in patent prosecution practice to
draft claims in apparatus and method formats. Doing so, however,
does not generally impart patentable distinctiveness to one claim form
vis-A-vis another claim form. 13 6' 137 Following the essential features
dictate of Univis Lens in performing an analysis to determine the
patentable distinctiveness of a claim, one cannot rationally include
any consideration of the choice of claim drafting form.
The Patent and Trademark Office's ("PTO") Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure ("MPEP") provides guidance in determining
136. E.g. Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Funasaw Co., Ltd., 201 U.S.P.Q. 217, 222 (N.D.
I11. 1978) ("[T]he method of making the saws is of no patentable significance.... no method
limitations were added to the claims to secure allowance thereof. The file histories do not
establish that alleged method recitals of the claims were imposed by the Patent Office for
purposes of allowance.").
137. The law regarding patentable distinctiveness between compounds and their methods
of use is analogous. E.g., Geneva Pharm. Inc. v. Glaxo Smith Kline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1386
(Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The '720 patent claims nothing more than Fleming's disclosed utility as a
method of using the Fleming compound. Thus, the claims of the Fleming and '720 patents are
not patentably distinct."). The law regarding products and their methods of manufacture is
likewise analogous.
[S]ince the product in each of the appealed claims is defined essentially in terms
of the method by which it is made, the fact that the claims of the patent and the
application are, technically, in different statutory classes, is not in itself, enough
to avoid a rejection on the ground of double patenting.
In re Freeman, 166 F.2d 178 (CCPA 1948).
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patentable distinctiveness between apparatus and method (process)
claims:
Where the claims of an application define the same essential
characteristics of a single disclosed embodiment of an invention,
restriction therebetween should never be required. This is because
the claims are but different definitions of the same disclosed
subject matter, varying in breadth or scope of definition.138
Where the two inventions are process and apparatus, and the
apparatus cannot be used to practice the process or any part
thereof, they are independent.
39
Process and apparatus for its practice can be shown to be distinct
inventions, if either or both of the following can be shown: (A) that
the process as claimed can be practiced by another materially
different apparatus or by hand; or (B) that the apparatus as claimed
can be used to practice another and materially different process.
140
Thus, the standard for patentable distinctiveness between
apparatus and method claims is that one can be practiced independent
of the other. Since this is the standard for allowance of method and
apparatus claims in the same application, it stands to reason that an
exhaustion analysis based on patentable distinctiveness should be
conducted with the same standard.
Applying the PTO standard to LGE's Lagoy patent, 141 for
example, results in a conclusion of exhaustion of the method claims,
i.e., the claimed apparatus cannot be used to practice a materially
different process and the claimed process cannot be practiced by a
materially different apparatus. This is necessarily consistent with the
outcome of an analysis based on a comparison of essential features
because both analyses turn on the presence or absence of the same
patentably distinct 42 subject matter in the two types of claims.
VII. THERE IS No INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE IMPLIED
LICENSE AND EXHAUSTION DOCTRINES
The standard for the grant of an implied license is: (1) the article
sold must not have any reasonable noninfringing uses and (2) "the
138. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 806.03 (Rev. Aug. 2001).
139. Id. § 806.04(B).
140. Id. § 806.05(e).
141. Discussed supra in Section VID.
142. Note that patentable distinctiveness requires that claims are novel and unobvious vis-
A-vis each other. MPEP § 802.01.
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circumstances must plainly indicate that the grant of a license should
be inferred." 143 With regard to the first requirement, no license can be
implied where "the equipment involved has other noninfringing uses,
even if only as replacement parts." 144 The second requirement is met
if the patentee's actions lead the alleged infringer to believe that it has
a license to use the invention and, in reliance on those actions, the
alleged infringer practices the patent.145 Implied license is a contract-
based theory, and can thus be limited or disclaimed where it is clear
that the parties so intended. 146 As the Federal Circuit observed in
Stickle v. Hublein:
the relatively few [cases] where implied licenses have been found
rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel...
One common thread in cases in which equitable estoppel
applies is that the actor committed himself to act, and indeed acted,
as a direct consequence of another's conduct. Thus, an implied
license cannot arise out of the unilateral expectations or even
reasonable hopes of one party. One must have been led to take
action by the conduct of the other party.
14 7
As discussed above, a proper exhaustion analysis based on
Univis Lens involves an essential features analysis.148 Under such an
analysis, an article which embodies the essential features, i.e., the
patentably distinctive features, of a patent claim necessarily has no
noninfringing uses. But the converse is not true, i.e., the authorized
sale of an article which has no use other than to practice a patent
claim does not necessarily embody the essential features of the claim,
and thus does not necessarily result in patent exhaustion.
Specifically, where the article sold is covered by a claim which is
patentably distinct from another claim, the other claim is not
exhausted. Unlike the implied license doctrine, the exhaustion
doctrine is based on patent policy, which grants exclusive rights to
patentees, but also limits those rights. 149 Exhaustion is a limitation
143. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Glass Equip.
Dev. Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
144. Bandag, 750 F.2d at 924 (quoting Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U.S. 1, 11 (1888)).
145. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
146. E.g., Jazz Photo v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
147. Stickle v. Hublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
148. See supra notes 4-46 and accompanying text.
149. As explained in an article by Cohen and Lemley:
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which ends patent rights insofar as they are embodied in the
authorized disposition of an article.'s°
The doctrine of implied license often results in much the same
conclusion as exhaustion, i.e., buying an article includes the implied
right to use and resell the article. However, "while patent exhaustion
stems from inherent limits on the grant of the patent right, implied
license is a doctrine of quasi-contract, and depends on the beliefs and
expectations of the parties to the sales transaction. ''
The apparent similarity in the exhaustion and implied license
standards with respect to a focus on "noninfringing uses" has created
a great deal of confusion in the caselaw and among commentators.
Also, the "circumstances of the sale" inquiry in an implied license
analysis has been confused with the "lawful restriction" inquiry
Exhaustion represents one such limit on a patentee's right to control his/her
invention: that control ceases with respect to a particular product once she has
sold that product. In the words of the Supreme Court, "when the machine passes
to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It
passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the [patent laws]." It
is not the patent right itself that is exhausted, of course. The patentee retains the
rights to prevent anyone else, including the buyer, from making, using, or selling
additional copies of the patented item. But once the patentee has sold a particular
product, its control over that particular product ends, and the general legal
antipathy toward restraints on alienation takes over.
J. Cohen & M. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 31 (2001) (quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852)).
150. E.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873); United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
Inc. 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).
151. Cohen & Lemley, 89 CALIF. L. REV. at 31-32 ("Both doctrines have traditionally
drawn a distinction between using and reselling a particular copy of a patented product, which is
permissible, and making a new copy of a patented product, which is not."). The distinction
between the two doctrines was discussed in the first LGE decision:
The patent exhaustion doctrine.... is derived from the statutory grant of
exclusivity to the patentee.... The implied license doctrine, on the other hand,
derives not from statute, but from principles of equity.... [T]he patent
exhaustion doctrine applies when a patentee has, in essence, sold its statutory
right to exclusivity through the unrestricted sale or license of the patent. A
patentee who has not abandoned its statutory right to exclude others from the use
of its patent may nevertheless, through conduct that induces reliance, grant to
particular parties an implied license to practice the patent. Although similar in
effect, the doctrines require distinct analysis. To determine if a patent was
exhausted, the court must assess whether the terms of the patentee's sale remove
the invention from the protection of the patent law. The determination of
whether an implied license exists, however, is necessarily more fact specific.
The court must determine whether the patentee's acts lead the accused infringer
to believe it had acquired the right to practice the patented invention.
LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589, 1598 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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pertinent to an exhaustion analysis. 15 2  But the differences between
the two doctrines are not merely tautological; they go to the very
foundations of the doctrines.
The confusion between patent exhaustion and implied license
can be entirely eliminated by focusing on the essential features of a
patent claim when performing an exhaustion analysis. The confusion
developed because of a straying of the caselaw from the doctrinal
foundation of Univis Lens. The discussion of noninfringing uses in
Univis Lens itself was somewhat ambiguous and may be the origin of
the confusion. As a result, many courts and commentators purporting
to apply Univis Lens have assumed that noninfringing use must mean
the same thing in both contexts. They are correct, but only up to a
point. The meaning is the same but noninfringing use is the incorrect
standard for an exhaustion analysis under Univis Lens. The central
focus of Univis Lens was on whether there had been a sale of an
article embodying the invention. 153 The noninfringing uses discussion
in Univis Lens was an explanation of the result of the essential
features analysis, not a separate requirement or basis for finding
exhaustion. The presence or absence of acceptable noninfringing uses
is not dispositive of the exhaustion issue under the correct
interpretation of Univis Lens as discussed above.
Adherence to the essential features dictate of Univis Lens and its
progeny and the "circumstances of the sale" dictate of the Met-Coil
line of implied license cases makes apparent the following:
(1) If an article embodies essential features of a patent claim,
the authorized sale of the article exhausts that claim.
152. See Cohen & Lemley, 89 CALIF. L. REV. at 31 ("Indeed courts have frequently
conflated the two doctrines."); see also Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair,
Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 495
(1999) (cataloguing instances of confusion between exhaustion and implied license); see also,
e.g., LifeScan, Inc. v. Polymer Technology Int'l Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1231 (W.D. Wash.
1995) (analyzing Univis Lens under the implied license doctrine); Michael J. Swope, Recent
Developments in Patent Law: Implied License-An Emerging Threat to Contributory
Infringement Protection, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 281, 286 (1995) ("Under patent exhaustion theory,
the purchaser of a product acquires an implied license to patent claims that cover the product
and may also acquire an implied license to incident patent claims.")(espousing a tortured three-
part analysis in an attempt to rationalize the purported exhaustion and implied license cases);
Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The Court's statements
in Univis demonstrate how closely related the exhaustion doctrine is to the grant of an implied
license. Indeed, they suggest that an implied license stems from the exhaustion of a patent
right."); Arizona Cartridge, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 ("To determine whether a patent holder
exhausted its rights with an unconditional sale or retained them with a conditional one (which
some courts define as a license), a court looks to the circumstances of the sale.") (quoting
Anton/Bauer).
153. 316 U.S. at 249-51.
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Whether the claim is to an apparatus or method should
not matter, nor should the circumstances of the sale make
any difference. 54
(2) An implied license may also result from the sale of an
article embodying essential features of a patent claim if
the circumstances of the sale indicate that a license was
granted.
(3) An implied license may result from the sale of an article
not embodying essential features of a patent claim if the
article has no reasonable noninfringing use and the
circumstances of the sale indicate that a license was
granted.
A noninfringing uses inquiry is pertinent to both implied license and
exhaustion. However, patentably distinctive features frame the
exhaustion analysis, whereas implied license is fundamentally a
contract-based doctrine which also requires examination of the
circumstances of the sale. An article having the essential features of a
patent claim has no reasonable use other than to practice the patent
claim. Exhaustion applies in this situation, and an implied license
may also apply. However, an article having no reasonable
noninfringing use does not necessarily embody the essential features
of the claim, i.e., if the asserted claim is patentably distinct from the
article sold. An implied license may apply in this situation, but
exhaustion does not.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The confusion regarding patent exhaustion as manifested in
often-conflicting Federal Circuit and district court decisions can be
eliminated by adopting an analytical procedure strictly following the
Supreme Court's Univis Lens decision. Univis Lens and its progeny
make clear that the sale of an article embodying the essential features
of a patent claim results in the exhaustion of that claim. This
conclusion applies equally to any type of patent claim, i.e.,
component, apparatus, composition, system, combination, method, or
process claims. Identifying the essential features of a patent claim,
i.e., the patentably distinct features, clarifies the exhaustion analysis,
154. As discussed above, pursuant to Mallinckrodt, the sale of a patented article can be
restricted but this does not mean that exhaustion of combination or method claims can be
disclaimed if such an attempted disclaimer goes beyond the scope of the patent grant. See supra
notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
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results in predictability, and eliminates the confusion between the
doctrines of exhaustion and implied license.
Adherence to the essential features dictate of Univis Lens in this
manner would not result in unfettered application of the patent
exhaustion doctrine, however. If there is no attempt to collect double
royalty recoveries or engage in prohibited post-sale control, the issue
of patent exhaustion never legitimately arises. Under Univis Lens, if
a patentee merely collects separate royalties for practice of separate
and distinct patent claims, there is no collection of double royalties.
Pursuant to Univis Lens, recovery of a royalty for practice of a
combination claim is not double recovery where the purchased
component, whether or not the component is patented, does not
embody all of the essential features of the combination claim.
Implied license may apply in this situation, but exhaustion does not.
However, if a component embodies all of the essential features of a
combination claim, under Univis Lens the authorized sale of such
component exhausts the combination claim, whether or not the
component is patented. Thus, where a purchaser obtains a component
from a licensed source and the component embodies all of the
essential features of a combination claim, the exhaustion doctrine
applies if there is an attempt to collect a royalty for practice of the
combination claim.
The relevance of noninfringing uses to both implied license and
exhaustion has led to a great deal of confusion in the application of
both doctrines and has made exhaustion seem particularly amorphous.
This confusion is eliminated if it is understood that patentably
distinctive features frame the exhaustion analysis under Univis Lens,
whereas implied license is a contract-based doctrine which also
requires examination of the circumstances of the sale. Thus, under
the interpretation of Univis Lens put forth here, a noninfringing uses
inquiry may produce different results for exhaustion and implied
license analyses on the same set of facts. If the allegedly infringed
claims are patentably distinct from the article sold, there is no
exhaustion, even if there are no reasonable noninfringing uses. A
focus on essential features, i.e., patentable distinctiveness, consistent
with Univis Lens, would avoid the confusion evident in much of the
prior caselaw and commentary on exhaustion.
In summary, based on a careful reading of Univis Lens and its
progeny, an article having essential features of a patent claim has no
reasonable use other than to practice the patent claim, and exhaustion
therefore applies in this situation. Depending on the circumstances,
the implied license doctrine may also apply. However, an article
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having no reasonable noninfringing use does not necessarily embody
the essential features of the claim, i.e., if the asserted claim is
patentably distinct from the article sold there is no exhaustion of the
claim under a Univis Lens essential features analysis. The implied
license doctrine may apply in this situation, but exhaustion does not.
The analytical procedure set forth herein based on the holding of
Univis Lens can be applied to any set of facts and will result in
consistent predictions regarding applicability of the patent exhaustion
doctrine. A clear statement by the Federal Circuit of adherence to the
essential features standard of Univis Lens would go far in eliminating
the inconsistency in application of the patent exhaustion doctrine. A
subsidiary, but important, additional benefit would be to eliminate the
apparent inconsistencies between the patent exhaustion doctrine, the
implied license doctrine, the repair/reconstruction doctrine, and the
statutory contributory infringement standard. These inconsistencies
result largely from varying applications of the common
"noninfringing uses" test in the different contexts, and would be
wholly resolved by adherence to the essential features standard.
i
